Understanding the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change has been dubbed a 'gateway belief' to engaging people in sustainable behaviour. We consider the question of how the impact of a consensus communication can be maximised. Firstly, the credibility of the communicator should be maximised.
effectiveness of the communication of expert consensus. Finally, we present two experiments as an initial test of the potential efficacy of these methods.
Source credibility
The statements presented at the top of this article represent pieces of testimony.
That is, someone is stating that this proportion of experts agree on this fact. Arguably, most of what we believe we know stems from the testimony of others. As an example, most people's belief that North America is west of Europe is based on a map that another individual has drawn. Even our experience of travelling by plane provides little direct evidence as to the directional relationship between the continents. The current authors' (firm) belief that America does lie west of Europe is based primarily on a level of trust in map makers (and geography teachers).
As the example above suggests, source credibility is a key factor underlying how persuasive a piece of testimony should be (e.g., Bovens & Hartmann, 2003; Friedman, 1987; Schum, 1981) . Moreover, Hahn, Harris and Corner (2009; see also Harris, Hahn, Madsen, & Hsu, 2016) have demonstrated that people can incorporate considerations of source credibility into their evaluation of a communication in a normatively appropriate manner. It is thus important to give source credibility due attention in consensus communications.
One way in which a source might be unreliable is if they are deliberately deceitful. Perceptions of deceitfulness are at the heart of conspiracy claims such as 'the moon landings were faked to demonstrate the United States' superiority over the USSR'. The potential for deceit is an issue of genuine concern in an evaluation of testimony. However, considerations of source credibility are not only integral in instances of wilful deceit. A lack of competence should also influence the persuasiveness of a piece of testimony. As an extreme example, if your (honest -i.e., there is no misdirection involved) friend flips a coin under a cup and says "I think it's heads", you should not update your belief that the coin under the cup has landed on heads. Your friend in this instance has no privileged information -they are as likely to say "heads" if the coin has come up heads as if it has come up tails. Subsequently, their 'testimony' is non-diagnostic of the true state of the world. Less extreme examples are ubiquitous. As one example, multiple factors are known to impact the accuracy of eyewitness testimony, even where the eyewitness has no motivation to provide a biased testimony (for a review see Wells & Olson, 2003) . The two components to source credibility (the more malevolent deceit and the less malevolent paucity of knowledge) have been termed, variously: veracity and sensitivity (Schum, 1981 (Schum, , 1994 1 ); trustworthiness and expertise (Hahn, Oaksford, & Harris, 2012; Harris et al., 2016; Walton, 2008) ; helpfulness and knowledgeability (Shafto, Eaves, Navarro, & Perfors, 2012 ).
Concepts of source credibility are central to the evaluation of a communication of scientific consensus at two levels. The first level is the individual scientists themselves. There is a great difference in the convincingness of the agreement of 84% of medical scientists if they are known to be the 'crackpots' (low in trustworthiness and expertise), whereas the 16% who disagree with the statement are the respectable scientists high in both trustworthiness and expertise. Source credibility also becomes a relevant concept wherever an individual is not experiencing the level of consensus for themselves (e.g., by reading original journal articles or interviewing individual scientists). As an illustration, throughout this manuscript we quote figures of scientific consensus. For you, the reader, therefore, not only is the credibility of the individual scientists within the consensus important, but also our credibility as accurate purveyors of information. In fact, as can be seen from citations accompanying the three examples at the outset of this article, we have not experienced the consensus levels ourselves, and consequently the credibility of Cook et al. (2013) , Green (2016) and Whelton et al. (2002) become relevant. Figure 1 shows a Bayesian Network demonstrating the complexity of the inferences that must be made. In this network, the expertise and trustworthiness of the individual scientists are not represented explicitly due to space constraints, but they can be captured in the probabilistic relationships (the arrows)
linking the true fact about ACC with what is reported by each expert (for an introduction to Bayesian Networks, see e.g., Korb & Nicholson, 2003; Pearl, 1988 ; on their application in this particular context see Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; Hahn et al., 2016 ; for other examples see e.g., Harris et al., 2016; Jern et al., 2014; Kadane & Schum, 1996; Lagnado, 2011; . Figure 1 demonstrates that the report of expert consensus on the topic of ACC presented at the outset of this article is 'third hand.' In addition to the potential for error Following Hahn et al. (2016) , in the present empirical work, we consider source credibility as it pertains to the reporter of the consensus (e.g., Cook et al. in Figure 1 ).
Furthermore, although the two different components of source credibility (trustworthiness and expertise) appear conceptually important and have been demonstrated to be necessary to fully capture use of testimony (e.g., in children, Shafto et al., 2012) , in the current paper we simplify the concept of source credibility and consider it as a single factor. Practically, it is however important to recognise that complete trust in the honesty (veracity) of a communicator, does not mean that they have not made honest mistakes (sensitivity).
Lessons from decision making
Having considered the formal question of what factors should influence the convincingness of a communication of expert consensus, we now turn to consider a potential lesson from descriptive research into decision making. Scholars of decision making have spent a considerable amount of research time and resources attempting to understand how people evaluate prospects such as 'A 90% chance of winning £10, otherwise nothing.' Indeed, gambles such as these have been deemed the 'fruit fly' of decision research (Lopes, 1983 ; see also Bateman, Dent, Peters, Slovic, & Starmer, 2007; Wulff, Mergenthaler-Canseco, & Hertwig, in press ).
Research investigating evaluations of gambles like the one above has demonstrated that people's valuations (measured directly and through choice paradigms) are well described by two functions which are non-linear transformations of the probability described in the gamble (i.e., 90%) and the value described in the gamble (i.e., £10) (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992 ; see e.g., Speekenbrink & Shanks, 2013 , for a review). Specifically, and of central interest for the current paper, people's decision making proceeds as though they underweight high (though less than certain) probabilities, and overweight low probabilities (see also, e.g., Gonzalez & Wu, 1999) . In the light of these findings, it is perhaps unsurprising that communication of high levels of scientific consensus has not had as much of an influence as might be hoped on people's overall perceptions of the consensus or decisions to engage in more sustainable behaviour. The 97% communicated in a statement such as the one at the start of this article is likely to be underweighted by recipients of the communication. Correspondingly, the 3% who (implicitly) are suggested not to agree with the consensus will be overweighted. More recent research into decisions from experience suggests a way in which the influence of the high consensus might be enhanced. Barron and Erev (2003) shook up decision making research with their demonstration that a number of well-established and robust decision making phenomena did not hold (indeed, mostly were reversed) when the presentation of the gambles was altered. Specifically, rather than having the parameters of a given gamble described to them (e.g., "90% chance of winning £10, otherwise nothing"), participants learn the structure of the gamble through experience. For example, the gamble described above might be recreated by asking the participant to press a button multiple times (e.g., 100, 200, 400 times in the different experiments reported in Barron & Erev) .
On 90% of occasions, the button would yield £10, whilst on 10% of occasions it would yield nothing. Typically, in decisions from experience, participants would be required to choose between different buttons, with different payoffs.
The critical finding for the present paper is that when outcomes are experienced rather than described, the best fitting function capturing the influence of probability on decisions has the opposite properties to that observed for described outcomes. Namely, low probabilities are now underweighted and high probabilities are overweighted (e.g., Hau, Pleskac, Keifer, & Hertwig, 2008; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004; Rakow, Demes, & Newell, 2008; Ungemach, Chater, & Stewart, 2009 ; for an reviews see Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Wulff et al., in press) . Although there are arguments that this so-called decision-experience 'gap' arises primarily from an underexperience of the rare outcome, either in the whole, or in recently experienced samples (Camilleri & Newell, 2011b; Fox & Hadar, 2006; Rakow et al., 2008 ; see also Jarvstad, Hahn, Rushton, & Warren, 2013) , the descriptive phenomenon remains.
Typically, when gambles are experienced rather than described, people make choices as though they overweight high probabilities and underweight low probabilities. Thus, if
we wish to maximise the influence of high scientific consensuses on people's subsequent decisions (e.g., regarding sustainable behaviour), the decision making literature suggests that presenting people with the consensus in an experiential format will be more effective than merely describing it to them.
How might we improve the communication of scientific consensus?
In our experiments we focus on the importance of source credibility and the format of consensus communication. The literature reviewed above provides two clear suggestions for improving consensus communications: 1) Present the information from a reputable (trustworthy and expert) source; 2) Have people experience the consensus, rather than merely describing it to them. It is worth noting that the latter suggestion stems both from the lessons learnt from decision making research and from formal work on source credibility. In the case of the latter, pure experience of the scientists' consensus (i.e., personal interviews with all the scientists), removes two 'layers' from
Figure 1 ('Cook et al.' and 'Harris et al.') . Consequently, there are fewer, potentially fallible, steps between the level of consensus of the scientists (zero -this is experienced directly) and the objective truth about ACC (one). Thus, we predict that the effect of a communication of expert consensus will be greater the more trustworthy and expert the source describing the consensus is, but it will be greatest where participants experience the consensus.
In the following, we present two experiments to test these predictions, noting that the manipulation of experience is somewhat impoverished. Nevertheless, we hope that these experiments will encourage future researchers to further test the effectiveness of experiencing expert consensus, given the strong theoretical support for its effectiveness.
Experiment 1

Method
Participants
After excluding four incomplete entries, 161 British nationals (75 female, 1 preferred not to say; aged 18-61 [median = 33]) were recruited through the online crowdsourcing platform Prolific Academic (www.prolific.ac). The participants were each paid £0.60.
Ethical approval for both experiments in this paper was granted from the Departmental Ethics Chair for Speech, Hearing and Phonetic Sciences (University College London).
Design
Participants were presented with three out of nine possible communications, each one presenting consensus information about one of three topics. The first independent variable was Topic -participants were presented with consensus information on each of following three topics: climate change, politics (Brexit) and medicine. The second independent variable was Format -consensus information pertinent to the relevant topic was presented either by a reliable source or an unreliable source, or 'experienced.' Each participant saw one (different) format for each topic, and each topic was presented only once.
The dependent variables were estimates of consensus levels (perceived consensus [out of 100]) and beliefs about the claims towards a topic, measured on a 5-point scale from "strongly disagree" [1] to "strongly agree" [5] . These were collected both before (prior) and after (posterior) participants received consensus information about each of the three topics. In the Experience condition, participants were presented with ten sets of ten fictional experts' silhouettes, each expert either agreeing or disagreeing with one of the three aforementioned statements. The level of agreement/disagreement was identical to the consensus reported by the reliable and unreliable sources. Although the order of the silhouettes within each set was fixed, their initial order had been randomised, and the order in which the ten sets were displayed was also randomised. To personify the fictional experts, they were each identified with pseudo-random initials (such that there
were not a high number of uncommon initials; see Figure 2 for an example set from the climate change condition).
As the reliable sources, fictional anonymous professors of renowned UK universities (Oxford, Cambridge, LSE) were presented. For example, a participant presented with a reliable medical source would have read the following:
Carefully consider the following report:
'84% of medical scientists agree that aerobic exercise lowers blood pressure.'
Source: Review by a professor of Medical Sciences, University of Cambridge
To determine the unreliable sources, a pilot study was run via Prolific Academic. For each of the three topics, 40 participants were presented with the appropriate aforementioned consensus information, and presented with a list of nine sources expected to vary in perceived trustworthiness and expertise. Participants were asked to rate the sources' trustworthiness and expertise on a scale of 0-100. The following unreliable sources were subsequently chosen for the main experiment: a political columnist in a politically left-leaning publication for climate change; a political columnist in a politically right-leaning publication for Brexit; and a medical columnist in a politically right-leaning publication for the medical topic. For each of these three sources, the balance of bias (i.e. lack of trustworthiness) and expertise was the same, namely they were all rated as more untrustworthy than they were unknowledgeable. Union to determine the scope of influence of the consensus communication.
Procedure
The experiment was run through the online data collection platform Qualtrics.com.
After receiving instructions and giving consent to participate, participants completed the prior beliefs and attitudes questionnaire. Next, they were presented with consensus information on all three topics. After each presentation of consensus information, participants were asked to provide some demographic data before being asked to again indicate their beliefs about statements relevant to the consensus information just presented (the questions were identical to the first two questions in the prior beliefs and attitudes questionnaire outlined above). Finally, after proceeding through these questions for all three topics, the participants were again asked to indicate their agreement with the statement "I am in favour of Britain leaving the European Union".
Results
In both Experiments 1 and 2, we analyse perceived consensus levels separately from beliefs about the claims. For each dependent variable, we use a linear mixed effects analysis as an alternative to a repeated-measures ANOVA, which would have been inappropriate as every participant did not complete every combination of Format and
Topic. The models includes fixed effects for Format, Topic, and Prior/Posterior, as well as all two-way and three-way interactions. To account for the repeated-measures, the models included participant-specific random intercepts. All models were estimated with the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2016) for the R software environment (R Core Team, 2017), and test results are based on the Satterthwaite approximation to the degrees of freedom, obtained with the R package lmerTest (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017) .
Perceived consensus levels
The linear mixed-effects model yielded no effects of, nor interactions involving, Format. Of most relevance, the Format x Prior/Posterior interaction was not significant, 
Beliefs about the claims
Given the lack of effects on perceived consensus levels, it would be surprising to observe an effect on people's beliefs about the claims. Inspection of Figure 4 Australian participants, and counter to those in the latter's U.S. participants.
Nineteen of the 157 respondents who reported their attitude to Brexit both before and after the consensus communications provided different ratings at the two time points. Fourteen of these became less favourable towards Brexit, whilst 5 became more favourable.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 were somewhat disappointing. Despite the clear theoretical justification for the predictions that the Format manipulation would affect the persuasiveness of the consensus communication, there was no evidence to support this.
The effect of the consensus communication (main effect of Prior/Posterior) on participants' reported beliefs about the claims presented replicates other findings in the literature (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013; van der Linden et al., 2014) .
Communicating information about actual levels of scientific consensus influences both perceptions of that consensus, as well as beliefs about the claims about which there is a consensus.
Despite the lack of support obtained in Experiment 1 for the main prediction that communication format would influence perceptions of scientific consensus levels, and associated beliefs, the basic design of the experiment was repeated in Experiment 2.
Whilst Experiment 1 recruited UK participants via Prolific Academic, Experiment 2 recruited U.S. participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Whilst about 90% of people in the UK believe that climate change is happening (Capstick, Demski, Sposato, Pidgeon, Spence, & Corner, 2015) , the number in the US is only about 70% (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Feinberg, & Rosenthal, 2014) . We thus anticipated greater variance in prior beliefs about ACC in this sample, potentially increasing the power of our manipulation. In addition, we (nearly) doubled the sample size.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants
Excluding two participants who reported problems viewing the silhouettes in the 
Design, Materials, and Procedure
The materials and procedure were, for the most part, identical to Experiment 1. Due to the Brexit vote being in the past by the time Experiment 2 was conducted, and the U.S.
population perhaps not being overly involved or interested in the issue in the first place, Secondly, because in Experiment 1 the participants' prior consensus belief ratings for the medical topic were on average higher than the reported 'correct' consensus statistic, this number was raised from the previous 84% to 96% in Experiment 2, in order that prior consensus beliefs were mostly lower than the reported statistics, facilitating more meaningful comparisons between the climate change and medical topics. Participants were notified of this change in the debrief.
Finally, the university for all the reliable sources was changed to Harvard University to ensure relevance for U.S. participants.
Results
Perceived consensus levels
In the linear mixed-effects analysis, the critical Format x Prior/Posterior interaction was significant, F(2, 1483.71) = 6.58, p < .001. Figure 5 shows mean estimates of the consensus across the three topics. In each of the three topics, the greatest difference between prior and posterior estimates was in the Experience condition, as predicted. This is confirmed by the individual contrasts comprising the interaction, which show that the Prior/Posterior effect was greater in the Experience condition versus the 
Beliefs about the claims
Having observed an effect of communication format on perceived consensus levels, a downstream effect might also be observed on people's beliefs about the claims. Figure 6 shows that, numerically, the pattern of results is in the predicted direction, with the greatest change in belief observed in the Experience condition across all three topics.
There was no evidence, however, that this was a reliable result, with the In Experiment 2, beliefs about ACC were not predicted by an interaction between FMB (mean support 2.6/5) and Prior/Posterior, Beta = 0.03, p = .37, but FMB did predict beliefs both before, r(298) = -.58, p < .001, and after, r(298) = -.54, p < .001, consensus communications.
Discussion
Once again, an overall effect of consensus communication on reported beliefs was observed. Of more relevance to the current paper, and more encouragingly than Experiment 1, Experiment 2 showed the greatest change in perceived consensus levels was brought about in the Experience condition. This provides the first direct evidence that such a presentation might be beneficial in expert consensus communications. That the effect did not filter through to influence reported beliefs about the claims presented, despite an effect of consensus communication on said beliefs, might be a result of the small effect size on perceived consensus levels, which was not able to influence responses on a 5-point response scale.
General Discussion
We have set out conditions that we expect to facilitate the communication of expert consensus information, specifically highlighting the role of 'experiential'
communications from reliable experts. Two experiments provide mixed support for the prediction that such communications will lead to greater change in perceived consensus levels and related beliefs. Experiment 1 provided no support for the prediction in a UK sample, whilst Experiment 2 (U.S. sample) observed a small, but reliable, effect on perceived consensus levels, but no effect on beliefs about the statements being made.
There are a number of possible reasons for the mixed support for our hypotheses, and space constraints prevent us from considering them all here. Of course, the first is that the hypotheses were wrong. Given the justification for the hypotheses from different areas of psychology, however, we are reluctant to arrive at that conclusion too swiftly. We believe that a search for appropriate means for conveying consensus information 'experientially' is a fruitful one. We therefore primarily focus on two alternative, non-exclusive, reasons for the mixed nature of our data. One is that our operationalisation of 'experience' was insufficient. The other relates to the potential for ceiling effects.
Support for the potential for ceiling effects operating in these data is evident from a comparison of the two experiments, focussing on the climate change scenario, since all elements of that scenario were common across the two experiments. In both experiments, participants were informed that the scientific consensus was 97%. Similarly, even in the U.S., mean ratings of belief in human caused climate change were 4.1 (out of 5) at the start of the experiment, and 4.3 after receiving an Unreliable consensus communication. Thus, once more, the skew of responses towards the top of the scale likely contributed to the lack of an effect on belief ratings.
Ceiling effects might therefore have compromised the power of the experiments presented. This is, however, something of a conjecture, and future research should seek to test the influence of experience in consensus communications using messages where:
3 These estimates are higher than usually observed; we did not recruit nationally representative samples. We hypothesised a benefit of an 'experiential' communication based on considerations of source credibility, and from observations in the decision making literature. It is also true, however, that the Experience condition required participants to spend more time thinking about the expert consensus. Whilst this could be seen as a confound, we see it as an integral part of experience. Experience will typically require more time and effort than simple testimony (running the experiments and analysing the data oneself -ultimate experience -would take longer still!). We are non-committal on the precise psychological mechanisms that could underlie the benefits of the Experience condition. As specified in the Introduction, the decisions from experience literature suggests a few contributing mechanisms (for reviews see Hertwig & Erev, 2009; Wulff et al., in press ; see also Hills & Hertwig, 2010; Jarvstad et al., 2013) , in addition to the potential for fundamentally different decision processes being involved (Hau et al., considerations of source expertise) are potentially additional contributing factors.
Indeed, the fact that there are many factors that could generate such an advantage, to us makes it all the more important that the potential for such a benefit is fully explored.
Conclusion
Expert consensus is fundamental to the continual development of society and technological advancement. In some domains, especially those with political considerations, public support is required for necessary policy changes in light of expert consensus. Consequently, how information about expert consensus is best communicated is an important applied question. From the literatures on source credibility and decision making, we suggested that the potential to experience high levels of expert consensus would be more effective than a simple numerical description of that consensus. We observed some support for such a prediction in one of two experiments testing this prediction. We argue that the mixed nature of these results potentially stems from ceiling effects. Given the strong theoretical justification for the predictions, we encourage future researchers to seek to identify optimum methods for presenting consensus information 'experientially.' 
